Siege of Suncheon

Siege of Suncheon
Part of the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)

Donjon of the Suncheon Japanese Castle
Date20 September – 2 November 1598
(1 month, 1 week and 6 days)
Location
Suncheon Japanese Castle, Southern Korean Peninsula
Result Japanese victory
Belligerents
Joseon and Ming dynasties Japanese army
Commanders and leaders
Ming
Liu Ting
Chen Lin
Joseon
Gwon Yul
Yi Sunsin
Konishi Yukinaga
Strength
Ming
13,600[1]
Joseon
10,000[1]
Naval forces
20,000 men[2]
Total
43,600[2]
Total
15,000[1]
500 Ships
Casualties and losses
>800[2] ?
  • v
  • t
  • e
Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)
1592–1594 Imjin War
1595–1596 Truce
1597–1598 Jeongyu War
Siege of Suncheon
Hangul
왜교성 전투
Hanja
倭橋城戰鬪
Revised RomanizationWaegyo Jeontu
McCune–ReischauerWaekyo Cheondu

The Siege of Suncheon or Siege of Japanese Fortress was an unsuccessful Korean and Chinese Allied Forces attempt to capture Suncheon Japanese Castle late in the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).

Prelude

Suncheon was the last wajo stronghold in Korea, housing 13,700 - 15,000 men and well-stocked with food and ammunition. The Japanese army planned to evacuate using the 500 ships in the harbor. The operation against Suncheon involved a combined land and sea effort between the Chinese Western Army and the naval commands of Admiral Yi and his Ming ally Chen Lin. Although the relationship between the two admirals was only sometimes smooth, they cooperated enough for the joint fleet to secure Jang Island. Jang Island was within view of Suncheon Castle and held Japanese equipment and provisions. The fleet then surrounded Suncheon while the Ming Army prepared on land; Liu Ting offered 60 gold pieces to any Chinese soldier who brought him a Japanese head. In a display of military ingenuity, General Liu Ting deployed various Chinese siege engines, including movable shields, siege towers, and ‘cloud ladders,’ to attack Suncheon. These intricate contraptions, taking several days to assemble, were a testament to the meticulous planning and preparation of the combined operation.[3]

Siege

The two forces prepared for an attack at dawn. The naval craft advanced and fought the enemy until noon, causing numerous casualties. The Japanese sallied out, inflicting 800 casualties on the Ming, but failed to break the siege.[2] Initially, they attempted to negotiate peace with Konishi Yukinaga in a ruse to lure him into the open, where he could be killed. Still, it failed when their cannons fired too early, and the Japanese forces returned to the fortress. Konishi tried to delay the attack by sending Liu a female companion the next day, but the allied forces attacked anyway.[2] The allies proceeded to bombard them for three days.[1]

While the navies bombarded Suncheon from the sea, the Chinese soldiers attempted to breach the land walls with siege towers and cloud ladders. However, they faced fierce resistance and were met with accurate arquebus fire. The lack of an alternative plan became evident as the siege engines became useless, and the Chinese had to pull back.[3]

Chen Lin and Yi Sunsin attempted to land but were driven back by Japanese gunfire. They gave up on 21 October.[1] The land and naval forces eventually conducted a joint attack on 31 October. Unfortunately, the land assault failed to move past the first screen of defenses. After three attempts the attack was called off.[4]

Frustrated by the failed land attack, General Liu Ting suggested a night assault on Suncheon from the sea. Admiral Chen Lin, determined to succeed, received reluctant support from Admiral Yi. On 1 November, the Allied fleet bombarded the fortress.[4] The assault, timed to coincide with the incoming tide just after midnight, resulted in a close-range bombardment that knocked out a considerable section of the Japanese fortifications. However, 30 - 39 Chinese ships ran aground as the tide turned, leading the Japanese to believe it was an attempted amphibious landing. This confusion allowed the Japanese to capture five Chinese ships, and only when Admiral Yi's ships came to the rescue were they driven off.[5]

Admiral Yi prepared for his attack, but a strong westerly wind prevented approach for the next two days. General Liu Ting, possibly informed of a simultaneous disaster at Sacheon, retreated north, leading to the evacuation of Suncheon.[5] The siege was lifted on 2 November.[4]

See also

Citations

  1. ^ a b c d e Hawley 2005, p. 528.
  2. ^ a b c d e Swope 2009, p. 271.
  3. ^ a b Turnbull 2007, p. 57.
  4. ^ a b c Hawley 2005, p. 531.
  5. ^ a b Turnbull 2007, p. 58.

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